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Mr. CLARK. I understand, of course, that they carry supplies at least sufficient to support the personnel.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Not only for the 4,500, but also to supply the 250,000 Vietcong and North Vietnamese regulars who are engaged in the war.

Mr. CLARK. I have heard it said that the amount of tonnage coming down the Ho Chi Minh trail this year is quite insignificant. As I recall, the committee had testimony to that effect. Perhaps the Senator from Missouri will recall that testimony before the Committee on Foreign Relations. Much of the tonnage came on bicycles.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I do not agree that the amount is small or insignificant. That is not my own estimate of the situation. I have read everything that has been written on the war between Vietnam and the French, and the amount of materiel of war that those people were able to move around on their heads and backs, on bicycles, and in baskets is absolutely staggering to the human imagination.

An accidental army could not begin to exist if it were forced to supply itself in the manner in which the North Vietnamese and the Vietcong are compelled to do today. I think that they move a considerable quantity of supplies. I believe that we have slowed them down somewhat by this bombing. But we have not interdicted them completely, and we never will. That is why I have advocated closing the Haiphong Harbor in addition to knocking out the two railroads from China.

Mr. President, I yield to my friend, the Senator from Missouri.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, this discussion is interesting. I happen to have a very high regard for the fighting characteristics of the American military. They have been sent to South Vietnam to defend the United States. They cannot ever expect success on a man-to-man basis because there are so many millions of people out there able to fight in this war. Therefore, they see quality as their only hope, quality of munitions, quality of supplies.

It is interesting to watch the development of these curious discussions in the newspapers and on the radio and television in the United States, concerning what we should or should not supply in the way of quality in our supplies, so as to help these young men to be successful in what they have been sent out there to do.

I am in complete agreement with my colleague from Georgia on the importance of destroying the docks at Haiphong. Nobody knows what and how much is coming through that harbor.

It is little more than some 150 miles at the most to Haiphong from Red China. It is a relatively simple trip, one which can be taken, and is being taken by many ships, ships owned by countries not friendly to the United States, as well as ships by countries that are friendly to the United States. But what worries me most is this slow but steady effort to denigrate the qualitative advances which, as a highly industrialized nation, we can offer our forces.

Nobody has considered the use of nuclear weapons. Nor should they. But many people apparently are worried about the amount of bombing we are doing in Vietnam. They are also worried about this limited defoliation. They ask about the use of gas, as the Senator from Georgia pointed out, a gas that does not permanently hurt people, one used all over the United States by policemen, in carrying out their duties in our cities.

People are worried about the type and caliber of our airplanes. They wonder whether these airplanes are too big, or too fast. Perhaps the words airplane, bomb, chemical defoliators and other words expressing our quality will be established soon as dirty words. What will the result be?

I have seen many rifles that were manufactured in China and Russia. These rifles are placed in the hands of the Vietcong and people from the north who live on a small amount of rice, have never had a good life and never expect much change.

We take a college graduate from the United States and put him in the jungle. He has a rifle. The Vietcong referred to has a rifle which is just as good as the rifle manufactured in the United States.

If the situation continues to develop as it is developing, soon the only way in which we will be willing to defend freedom will be by putting our men out with rifles to fight with their men with a rifle. It would then become a numbers game, a game which, in my opinion, our position would be hopeless from the standpoint of success; and it would also involve heavy additional casualties.

Mr. President, I have a statement I would make if the Senator from Georgia would yield.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I have the floor.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I understand the Senator from Pennsylvania had the floor for an hour, that he had asked for an hour.

Mr. CLARK. The Senator is quite correct.

Mr. SYMINGTON. If the Senator would yield, I thought the Senator from Georgia had the floor, was so told by a member of the staff.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I shall yield to the Senator from Missouri, but I should like to have the Record show that, having completed my comments in something less than an hour, I yielded the floor. Several other Senators took the floor.

I came back and asked if the Senator from Georgia would be willing to answer a few remaining questions which I had not had the opportunity to ask him yesterday. He very graciously said that he would.

We were in the middle of that colloquy when the Senator from Missouri came in.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I do appreciate the Senator yielding to me. There are only 20 minutes remaining before the vote.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield to the Senator from Missouri so that he may make a brief statement, without losing my right to the floor.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, I thank the able and distinguished Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. President, during recent weeks and months, there has been much discussion on this floor of the various Communist units, political and military, in North Vietnam and South Vietnam, primarily the Vietcong and the National Liberation Front; also others.

Many different statements and interpretations of the structure and functioning of these units have been made a part of the Record—to the point where, frankly, I have been somewhat unclear about the history and the actions of these various components.

Now, and perhaps for the first time in summarized fashion, a clear and concise presentation has been made by a scholar of political theory and Asian affairs, who also has served in Vietnam.

Anyone who wants better understanding of what has been and is going on in the relationship between the Ho Chi Minh government of North Vietnam and the Communists of South Vietnam will be intensely interested in this article. Therefore, I ask unanimous consent that an article "The Faceless Vietcong" by George A. Carver, Jr., be printed at this point in the Record.

There being no objection, the article was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

[From Foreign Affairs, April 1966]

## THE FACELESS VIETCONG

(By George A. Carver, Jr.)

"We [the Lao Dong (Communist) Party] are building socialism in Vietnam. We are building it, however, only in half of the country, while in the other half, we must still bring to a conclusion the democratic-bourgeois and anti-imperialist revolution. Actually, our party must now accomplish, contemporaneously, two different revolutions, in the north and in the south. This is one of the most characteristic traits of our struggle."

—HO CHI MINH, June 1959.<sup>1</sup>

The present struggle in South Vietnam is in essence the third act of a continuous political drama whose prologue spanned the 1930's, whose first act was played in the years between 1941 and 1945, and whose second encompassed the 1946-54 Franco-Viet Minh war. The scene of major action in this drama has shifted several times, as have the identities of the auxiliary players (e.g. the Chinese Nationalists, the British, the French, the Chinese Communists and now the Americans) and the political guises of some of the principals. Throughout its course, however, the unifying theme of this drama has been the unrelenting struggle of the Vietnamese Communist Party to acquire political control over all of Vietnam. Its chief protagonists, furthermore, have always been and are today the small, dedicated and doctrinaire group who, under Ho Chi Minh's guidance and direction, organized and nurtured Vietnam's Communist Party during the 1930's, usurped the nationalist revolution after World War II and subverted it to their ends. They are the same men who

<sup>1</sup> From a Hanoi interview by two correspondents of the Italian Communist Party journal *Unita*, published in *Unita* on July 1, 1959, and in the Belgian Communist paper *Le Drapeau Rouge* on July 10, 1959.

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run the Communist state already established in North Vietnam and who are now directing the insurgency designed to bring the southern part of the country under their domination.

The term "Vietcong" came into circulation around 1956 as a means of distinguishing some of the players in the current act of this ongoing political drama from the players in act II. "Vietcong" is a contraction of the phrase "Vietnam Cong-San," which means, simply, "Vietnamese Communist(s)." It is a descriptive term, not necessarily pejorative except, perhaps, in the sense of "If the shoe fits. . . ." It is a useful, precise and, as we shall see, accurate generic label for the individuals leading the present insurgent movement, at all levels, and for the organizational structure through which that insurgency is controlled and directed.

Not surprisingly, the reactions of many whose concern with Vietnam is of recent origin are analogous to those of theatergoers who walk into the middle of the third act of an extremely complex drama ignorant of what has gone before. To understand the Vietcong insurgency, its relationship to the North Vietnamese regime in Hanoi (the D.R.V.) and to the National Liberation Front and the People's Revolutionary Party in South Vietnam (and "their" respective interrelationships), it is essential to appreciate the historical setting within which the Vietcong movement developed and the ends it was created to serve.

Throughout their almost four decades of unremitting struggle for political power, the Vietnamese Communists have demonstrated great skill in coping with new problems and great tactical flexibility in pursuing unwavering strategic objectives. Yet, though skillful in learning from past failures, they have often become the victims of previous successes. For the past quarter-century the Vietnamese Communists have been doctrinally addicted to the political device of a broad front organization, dominated and controlled from behind the scenes by disciplined Communist cadres, but espousing general sentiments to which persons of all political inclinations can subscribe (though the formulation of these sentiments has invariably involved a special lexicon of key terms to which Communists and non-Communists attach radically different meanings). They have always rigidly subordinated military activity to political ends, and employed it not to inflict strategic defeat on enemy forces in the conventional sense, but as an abrasive to wear down their adversaries' will to fight and force their enemies to accept interim political settlements favorable to the continued pursuit of Communist political objectives.

Because of this Vietnamese Communist penchant for repeating political and military stratagems, a knowledge of recent Vietnamese history is particularly helpful in understanding the present insurgency. Although westerners may be largely ignorant of the scenario and detailed plot development of the previous acts of Vietnam's continuing political drama, the Vietnamese most decidedly are not. Virtually all politically minded Vietnamese have spent at least their adulthood, if not their whole lives, during the Communist struggle for power. Few indeed have not had their lives altered, conditioned or shaped thereby. Without appreciating what the Vietnamese have lived through and without recognizing some of the things they know intimately—often from all-too-first-hand experience—Westerners cannot hope to understand the attitude of Vietnamese now living south of the 17th parallel toward the insurgency, the Vietcong, the National Liberation Front and the Communist regime in Hanoi.

Under the direction of the man who now calls himself Ho Chi Minh, the Indochinese Community Party was organized in January, 1930. For the next decade the Vietnamese Communists concentrated on perfecting their organization, jockeying for position within the rising anti-French nationalist movement and attempting to undercut nationalist leaders or groups whom they could not subvert or bring under Communist control, using any means available, including betrayal to the French.

In 1941, the Vietnamese Communists joined a nationalist organization called the League for Vietnamese Independence (Vietnam Doc Lap Dong Minh Hoi—or Vietminh) which was sponsored by the Chinese Nationalists as a vehicle for harassing Japanese forces in Indochina but swiftly subverted by the Vietnamese Communists to further their own political objectives. By 1945 the Vietminh movement was under complete Communist control, despite the continued presence and subordinate participation therein of non-Communist nationalist elements whose names and talents the Communists were more than willing to exploit. In the chaotic aftermath of Japan's precipitate surrender, the Communists used the Vietminh as a device for seizing power in Hanoi and (on September 2, 1945) proclaiming the existence of the "Democratic Republic of Vietnam" under the presidency of Ho Chi Minh.

On November 11, 1945, in an effort to make the Vietminh government more palatable to non-Communist Vietnamese and to the Chinese Nationalist forces then occupying Vietnam down to the 16th parallel, Ho formally "dissolved" the Indochinese Communist Party, though the impact of this gesture on the discerning was considerably attenuated when the same day witnessed the formation of a new "Association for Marxist Studies." Complete control over the Vietminh and the subsequent resistance struggle, however, remained unchanged in essentially the same hands as those which control North Vietnam and the insurgency below the 17th parallel today.

By the late spring of 1946, the fact of Communist control over the Vietminh (despite the "nonexistence" of the party) was becoming increasingly apparent, as was the fact that Ho's political maneuvering and stalling negotiations with the returning French were not going to work. In preparation for the inevitable struggle, Ho endeavored to broaden the Communists' base of nationalist support. In May 1946 he announced the creation of a new "popular national front" (Lien-Hiep Quoc Dan Vietnam), known as the Lien-Viet, whose announced objective was the achievement of "independence and democracy." The Vietminh was merged with, and eventually absorbed by, the Lien Viet, though its name remained to serve as a generic label for those who participated in the subsequent armed struggle against the French. The Communists also brought into the Lien Viet two other small splinter parties which by then were under complete Communist control: the "Democratic Party," designed to appeal to "bourgeois elements" (i.e. urban trade, business, and professional circles), and the "Radical Socialist Party," designed to enlist the sympathies of students and intellectuals.

The war with the French broke out on

\*Despite the Vietnamese Communists' claim that their party did not "exist" under any name from 1945 until 1951, on Aug. 31, 1953, the Cominform journal noted that Vietnamese Communist Party membership increased from 20,000 in 1946 to 500,000 in 1950.

December 19, 1946, and its general course is sufficiently well known to require no rehearsal here. The northern part of Vietnam constituted the principal theater of military operations; the struggle in the south, though intense, was primarily a terrorist and harassing action designed to keep the French off balance and prevent them from concentrating either their attention or their forces on the war in the north. Though the Vietminh achieved these objectives, their efforts in South Vietnam were beset with a continuing series of problems. French control of the sea, air, and major overland routes left the Vietminh in the south dependent for supplies, reinforcements, cadres, and communications on a tortuous set of jungle tracks running through Laos (along the western slopes of the Annamite Chain) which came to be known, collectively, as the "Ho Chi Minh trail." Saigon politics were considerably more complex than those of Hanoi, and non-Communist Vietnamese political groups were both more numerous and more powerful in the south than they were in the north. Furthermore, the Communist leaders of the Vietminh had a series of command and control problems with their southern organization which took several years to resolve.

In 1945, the senior Vietminh representative in southern Vietnam was a Moscow-educated disciple of Ho Chi Minh and the Third International named Tran Van Glau, whose blatant ruthlessness and indiscriminate terrorist tactics alienated key groups that the Vietminh were anxious to bring into their fold, such as the Hoa Hao, Cao Dai and Binh Xuyen. Glau was accordingly recalled to Hanoi in January 1946 and his duties as Vietminh commander in the south were assumed by Nguyen Binh. Although eminently successful in harassing the French and furthering the cause of the nationalist revolution, Binh—a former member of the Communists' most militant nationalist rivals, the VNQDD—was never fully trusted by the Communist high command in the north and came to be considered excessively independent. In 1951 he was replaced by Le Duan, a charter member of the Indochinese Communist Party who is now first secretary of the Communist Party in North Vietnam and one of the most powerful figures in the Hanoi regime. Until 1954, and perhaps even later, Le Duan continued to play a major role in developing and directing the Vietminh organization in the south and in ensuring that it remained under firm Communist control. However, in late 1952 or early 1953 he was apparently compelled to share his authority with Le Duc Tho, the present head of the North Vietnamese Communist Party's Organization Bureau and also a member of its Politburo.\*

The 1949 Communist victory in China had a profound influence on the course of events in Vietnam, particularly after the Vietminh offensive in the fall of 1950 cleared the French out of the frontier area and gave the Vietminh a common border with their new Communist neighbor. The military consequences of ensuring Chinese Communist support to the Vietminh cause are fairly well known. The political consequences, less well known in the West, were of at least equal significance. With an increasingly powerful fraternal ally in immediate proximity, the Communist leadership of the Vietminh be-

\*During the Viet Minh era Le Duan and Le Duc Tho apparently had a violent quarrel over tactics which Ho Chi Minh himself had to settle. The details of this dispute are still obscure, but the resultant enmity between these two men has never been completely dissipated.

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came progressively less dependent on the good will and support of non-Communist Vietnamese nationalists. The mask could now be slipped. The fact of Communist direction of the Vietminh no longer had to be concealed, the instruments of Communists control could be made more effective, the nature of that control more rigid and its extent more pervasive.

The first major step in this direction was taken on March 3, 1951, when the Indochinese Communist Party reappeared as the Dang Lao Dong Vietnam, or Vietnamese Workers' Party. The Lao Dong swiftly assumed a position of absolute political primacy within the Lien Viet front, though for appearances' sake the "Democratic" and "Socialist" Parties mentioned above were kept in existence. The overt reconstitution of the Communist Party was doubtless prompted by a variety of considerations, of which the most important was probably the fact that covert domination of the Vietminh movement via a clandestine apparatus whose very existence had to be concealed was an awkward and inefficient process. It necessitated reliance on persuasion as well as coercion and, further, complicated the task of advancing Communist political objectives within those areas under Vietminh control.

The Vietminh was ostensibly a purely national movement dedicated to the twin goals of independence and democracy; its stated objective during the first phase of the armed struggle (1946-51) was simply to throw out the French. The emergence of the "new" party, however, brought forth a new slogan: "The anti-imperialist and the antifeudal fights are of equal importance." What this meant became increasingly apparent during the course of a systematic program which the Communists soon initiated and took 5 years to complete. It was designed to make the party itself more doctrinally orthodox and to restructure the whole society, at least of North Vietnam, along lines consonant with Communist dogma. This program was conducted in five stages, each carefully prepared and each preceded by intensive sessions of "thought reform" for both party and non-party cadres to insure that they would in fact execute the orders they were about to receive.

The first or "economic leveling" stage, launched in 1951, was designed to ruin the wealthier peasantry and the urban businessmen (to the extent that French control of the towns permitted this) through a complicated system of arbitrary and punitive taxes patterned on Chinese Communist models—as, indeed, were all phases of this Vietnamese Communist program.<sup>1</sup> The second stage was a short, sharp wave of terror launched throughout large parts of North Vietnam one evening in February 1953, a week before Tet, the lunar new year, and sustained for precisely fifteen days.<sup>2</sup> The patent objectives of this terror campaign were to cow the populace, in preparation for what lay ahead, and eliminate all potential centers of effective resistance. When the terror was shut off

<sup>1</sup>North Vietnam had virtually no large businesses in the Western sense; Vietnamese termed "capitalists" by the Lao Dong were generally what we would term small businessmen or merchants. Though there were inequities in land ownership in North Vietnam, the Red River Delta had the most extensive pattern of private ownership to be found anywhere in Asia and there were virtually no large "feudal" holdings of the kind that existed in pre-Communist China, or even in the Mekong Delta region of South Vietnam.

<sup>2</sup>Tet is the most important traditional Vietnamese family and religious holiday. Launching a terror wave just before Tet in Vietnam is like launching one a week before Christmas in the United States.

after accomplishing its purpose, Ho Chi Minh made one of his celebrated weeping apologies.

The next phase of the Communist program, implemented during 1953 and 1954, was euphemistically labelled "Land Rent Reduction." Carefully selected and specially trained teams of hardcore Communist cadres (some of which almost certainly had Chinese "advisers") went quietly to each village, made friends with the poorest therein, organized them into cells and helped them to draw up lists classifying their more prosperous neighbors with respect to wealth, status, political leanings and revolutionary zeal. Once all was in readiness, the "land reform battalions" came out in the open, set up kangaroo courts and administered summary "people's justice" to "exploiters" and "traitors." Each land-reform team had a preassigned quota of death sentences and hard-labor imprisonments to mete out and these quotas were seldom underfulfilled. In addition to calculated and extensive use of terror, the Communists marshalled all the pettiness, jealousy and vindictiveness of village life to serve their political ends. The punishments carried out extended not only to those actually convicted of "crimes" but also to their families, who were stripped of their possessions, turned out of their homes, denied means of obtaining a livelihood and deprived of the documentation (e.g., ration cards) essential to existence in a Communist-controlled society. They became, officially, "nonpersons" whom it was a crime to succor. The fact that many of those convicted and far larger numbers of their immediate relatives who suffered the attendant consequences had taken an active part in the resistance against the French was considered immaterial and irrelevant. No one was safe or immune from the judgments of the "people's courts," not even life-long members of the Communist Party.

Despite its incredible barbarity and violence, the land rent reduction campaign was but a preliminary—and a mild one by comparison—to the land reform campaign proper which followed, and which lasted from 1954 until 1956. Essentially the same methods and techniques were employed but on a much larger scale (e.g. the mandatory quota of death sentences and imprisonments for each village was increased fivefold). No one will ever know the exact human cost of these two campaigns, but the number of people killed was probably on the order of 100,000, and the number who suffered dire personal hardship was probably about half a million. Since North Vietnam has a population of about 18 million, these campaigns had a political impact roughly equivalent to that which would be felt in America if the U.S. Government deliberately engineered the murder of over a million American citizens.

The rationale for this politically motivated slaughter was rooted in the dogmatic fanaticism of the Vietnamese Communist leadership. The fact that only a small percentage of the party membership had genuine proletarian or "poor peasant" origins was doctrinally embarrassing and made a purge doctrinally mandatory. Dogma required that the "feudal-landlord" class be eliminated. Though no such class really existed in North Vietnam, it had to be created so that it could be destroyed. The object of the exercise was to purge the party, restructure North Vietnamese society, smash all real or potential opposition, and impose an iron grip of Communist control. The excesses, however unfortunate, were "necessary."

Once the land rent reduction and land reform campaigns had accomplished their objectives, the Lao Dong in 1956 opened the final phase of its five-step program. It was known as the "Rectification of Errors" and designed to restore North Vietnam to the Communist version of "normalcy." The ex-

mitted and, by implication at least, apologies were tendered. Ho wept (again). Truong Chinh resigned as Secretary-General of the Party (though he remained as member of its Politburo); so too did the DRV's vice minister for land reform. General Giap made a speech to the 10th Congress of the Party Central Committee during the course of which he acknowledged a long list of "errors" and mentioned that 12,000 Party members had been released from jails to which they had been unjustly consigned. (How many were imprisoned in the first place was never stated.) The apologies and explanations, however, provided an overwhelming body of irrefutable evidence regarding what had actually transpired and made it abundantly clear that throughout the whole process the party (as one of its spokesmen admitted) had been guided by the principle that "it is better to kill ten innocent people than to let one enemy escape."

## III

In the midst of the events we have so briefly described, the 1954 Geneva Conference brought the Franco-Vietminh war to a close and ended the second act of Vietnam's present political drama. This conference produced a set of four interrelated documents known collectively as the Geneva accords. Three were cease-fire agreements (one each for Laos, Cambodia and Vietnam) and the fourth an unsigned "Final Declaration," whose juridical status is open to dispute. A variety of external political considerations and pressures (including French domestic politics) had considerably more influence on the language of the accords than the objective realities of the situation in Vietnam. The problem of extricating France from her Indochinese entanglements as gracefully as possible was effectively solved and the shooting was temporarily halted, but more fundamental questions regarding Vietnam's political future were ignored or swept under the rug. At the time, the accords' crucial lacuna and ambiguities seemed relatively unimportant, since most of the conference's participants considered it virtually inevitable that all of Vietnam would soon be ruled by a Vietminh regime headed by the benign and (so it was thought) universally esteemed "Uncle Ho." Their significance did not become manifest until several years later.

Although the legal predecessor of the present Saigon government attended the conference (as the "Associated State of Vietnam"), none of the documents emanating from Geneva mentioned it by name or assigned it any rights or status. The Vietnam cease-fire agreement was signed by a French general on behalf of the "Commander in Chief of the French Union Forces in Indochina" and by the DRV's Vice Minister for National Defense on behalf of the "Commander in Chief of the People's Army of Vietnam." In discussing "political and administrative measures in the two regrouping zones" (art. 14), it makes a passing reference to "general elections which will bring about the unification of Vietnam," a theme amplified but not clarified in the conference's "final declaration" (which set a July 1956 deadline). Nowhere was it specified what precisely the Vietnamese were supposed to vote on or how the rights of various elements within the Vietnamese body politic were to be protected. Not surprisingly, the Saigon government objected formally and strenuously to these vague and airy dicta concerning Vietnam's future fate, stressing that it was not a party to these agreements

<sup>3</sup>Hoang Van Chi, "From Colonialism to Communism." London: Pail Mall, 1964 (also Praeger, New York), p. 213. This detailed study of the events we have outlined by a Vietnamese scholar and former Vietminh cadre merits the careful attention of those interested in Vietnamese affairs.

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and hence could not consider itself bound by them.<sup>7</sup>

Some of Ho's lieutenants felt that the Geneva settlement had cheated them of the full fruits of their victory, but on the whole the Communists had no reason to be dissatisfied with the results. The land-reform program was then in full cry and consolidation of Communist control over the north was the task immediately at hand. The south could wait, particularly since its chances of survival as an independent political entity seemed nil at the time.

The Lao Dong leadership went through the motions of overt compliance with the provisions of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement, though in doing so they took a number of steps to preserve a subversive potential in the south and thus insure themselves against unfavorable political contingencies. In accordance with the agreement, some 50,000 Vietminh troops were regrouped in specified areas below the 17th parallel and taken north, along with 25,000-odd Vietminh adherents and supporters. The Communists were very careful, however, to leave behind a network of cadres, which were instructed to blend into the scenery, deny Communist affiliation and agitate in favor of the scheduled elections. They also left behind a large number of weapons caches (3,561 of which were discovered between September 1954 and June 1959) against the day when their southern apparatus might have to augment political action with armed forces. The composition of the units taken north was also carefully structured with an eye to possible future needs. The Communists made sure that many of the persons involved were young, employing both coercion and impressment to get the kind of people that they wanted. Before they departed, personnel designated for regroupment were strongly encouraged or, in many cases, directly ordered to contract local marriages and family alliances in South Vietnam. These would stand them in good stead if they ever had to return.

In the aftermath of Geneva, the area south of the 17th parallel was in a state of political chaos bordering on anarchy. Ngo Dinh Diem, who became Premier on July 7, 1954, had only the shell of a government, no competent civil service, and a far from trustworthy army. In addition to all its other difficulties, the Diem government was also soon faced with an unexpected problem of major magnitude: refugees from the north. The myth that the Vietminh was a purely nationalist movement to which virtually all Vietnamese freely gave their political allegiance and that "Uncle Ho" was almost universally loved and esteemed by his compatriots was rudely shattered soon after Geneva by what became, proportionately, one of history's most spectacular politically motivated migrations.

<sup>7</sup>The American position was formally enunciated by President Eisenhower in a July 21, 1954, statement, which said in part: "... the United States has not itself been party to or bound by the decisions taken by the conference, but it is our hope that it will lead to the establishment of peace consistent with the rights and needs of the countries concerned. The agreement contains features which we do not like, but a great deal depends on how they work in practice.

"The United States is issuing at Geneva a statement to the effect that it is not prepared to join in the conference declaration, but, as loyal members of the United Nations, we also say that, in compliance with the obligations and principles contained in art. 2 of the United Nations Charter, the United States will not use force to disturb the settlement. We also say that any renewal of Communist aggression would be viewed as a matter of grave concern.

Article 14(d) of the Vietnam cease-fire agreement promised that civilians could move freely to whichever "regrouping zone" they preferred. The Communists accepted this provision with a notable lack of enthusiasm, hindered its implementation in a variety of ways and eventually, when its application became altogether too embarrassing, flagrantly violated it. Despite all Communist intimidation, obstruction and harassment, however, some 900,000 people fled from the north to the south uprooting themselves and their families in order to avoid living under Ho Chi Minh's Communist regime. (Given the relative population sizes, this was the political equivalent of 9 million Americans leaving the United States.) As many as 400,000 more wanted to leave, and were entitled to do so under article 14(d), but were not permitted by the Communist authorities to depart.

The 2-year period from 1954 to 1956 was one of political progress and achievement in South Vietnam that would have been considered impossible at the time of Geneva. The situation which prevailed in the summer of 1956 forced Hanoi to take stock of its prospects. The rather pro forma protests made by North Vietnam at the passing of the Geneva election deadline suggest that Hanoi's rulers were not so perturbed by the fact that the elections were not held as they were over the increasing disparity between political life north and south of the 17th parallel, a contrast considerably less than flattering to their regime. The north was just emerging from the throes of the land-reform campaign and was in a state of economic turmoil, while the south presented a picture of increasing political stability and incipient prosperity.

Hanoi accordingly recognized that more decisive action would be required if the south was to be brought under its control. Instructions were transmitted to the Communist network left behind in the south directing these cadres to begin agitation and political organization. The Lao Dong Party set up a department of its central committee called the Central Reunification Department, which was made responsible for all matters concerning individuals who had been regrouped to the north during the post-Geneva exchange of forces. The following year (1957) a PAVN major-general named Nguyen Van Vinh, who had served in various responsible posts in the south during the Franco-Vietminh war, was named chairman of this Reunification Department, an office he still holds.

The 1956-58 period was unusually complex, even for Vietnam. Diem, in effect, reached his political high-water mark sometime around mid-1957. After that, his methods of operation, traits of character and dependence on his family became set with ever increasing rigidity along lines which ultimately led to his downfall. Despite the undeniable progress of its early years, his government was never successful in giving the bulk of the South Vietnamese peasantry positive reasons for identifying their personal fortunes with its political cause. The administrators Diem posted to the countryside were often corrupt and seldom native to the areas to which they were assigned, a fact which caused them to be considered as "foreigners" by the intensely clanish and provincial peasantry. Land policies, often admirable in phraseology, were notably weak in execution and frequently operated to the benefit of absentee landlords rather than those who actually tilled the soil.

Such factors as these, coupled with the still manifest consequences of a decade of war, generated genuine grievances among the peasantry which the Communists were quick to exploit and exacerbate. Communist cadres began their organizational efforts

preaching Marxist doctrine. Cells were formed, village committees established and small military units organized. A pattern of politically motivated terror began to emerge, directed against the representatives of the Saigon government and concentrated on the very bad and the very good. The former were liquidated to win favor with the peasantry; the latter because their effectiveness was a bar to the achievement of Communist objectives. The terror was directed not only against officials but against all whose operations were essential to the functioning of organized political society: schoolteachers, health workers, agricultural officials, etc. The scale and scope of this terrorist and insurrectionary activity mounted slowly but steadily. By the end of 1958 the participants in this incipient insurgency, whom Saigon quite accurately termed the "Vietcong," constituted a serious threat to South Vietnam's political stability.

Despite the increasing trouble that Vietcong bands were causing and despite the Vietcong's initial success in organizational work, Hanoi was far from satisfied with the pace of Vietcong progress and was particularly chagrined at the movement's failure to win a really significant political following. Several Vietcong cadre members who were subsequently captured have reported that in late 1958 Le Duan himself was sent on an extensive inspection trip in the south, and that upon his return to Hanoi in early 1959 he presented a list of recommendations subsequently adopted by the Lao Dong Central Committee and referred to in Vietcong cadre training sessions as "Resolution 15." These recommendations laid out the whole future course of the southern insurgency, including the establishment of a National Liberation Front to be controlled by the Central Committee of the South Vietnamese branch of the Lao Dong Party and supported by a South Vietnamese "liberation army." The Front was to be charged with conducting a political struggle, backed by armed force, designed to neutralize the south and pave the way for "reunification," i.e., political domination by Hanoi. We can be certain that some such decisions were made about this time, for in May 1959 the Lao Dong Central Committee declared that "the time has come to struggle heroically and perseveringly to smash [the GVN]."

The consequences of these Hanoi decisions became increasingly apparent during the 18 months which followed the Central Committee's May 1959 meeting. The scale and intensity of Vietcong activity began to increase by quantum jumps. Communist military moves in Laos secured the corridor area along the North Vietnamese border and infiltrators from the north began moving down the "Ho Chi Minh Trail"; a few hundred in 1959, around 3,000 in 1960, and over 10,000 in 1961.

During 1959 and 1960 further evolution of the various stresses within the South Vietnamese body politic occurred. Diem's military establishment had been designed to counter the threat of conventional invasion and proved ill suited to cope with insurrectionary warfare. The quality of government administrators grew worse rather than better as Diem became increasingly inclined, in making key appointments, to put loyalty to himself and his family ahead of ability. His agrarian policies, particularly the disastrous "agroville" program of 1959, provided fresh sources of rural discontent. The Vietcong were quick to take advantage of the government's errors and steadily heightened the intensity of their terrorist activity. To complicate matters further there were rising political pressures within the non-Communist camp and a growing feeling that Diem had to be ousted before his methods of government made a Communist victory inevitable.

During the 1958-60 period, Hanoi's hand in southern troubles was quite imperfectly



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concealed. In August 1958 Hanoi radio, billing itself as "the voice of the Liberation Front," broadcast instructions to the Vietcong armed forces and village cadres directing them to adapt themselves to the requirements of the South Vietnamese political situation in order to carry out their missions. In October 1958, it openly appealed to the highland tribes to revolt, noting that "the government of our beloved Ho is standing behind you." In September 1959 and again in February 1960, Hanoi commented on recent Vietcong military forays by terming them "our attacks" and praising the "skill of our commander and the good will of our soldiers."

In September 1960 an almost open official seal was affixed to Hanoi's plans for southern insurgency when, at the Third National Congress of the Lao Dong Party, Le Duan made a lengthy speech in which he stated: "The present National Congress \* \* \* will define for the whole party and the whole people the line for carrying out the socialist revolution in the north, for the completion of the national people's democratic revolution throughout the country, for the struggle to achieve national reunification." In this speech Le Duan made a public call for the creation of a "broad national united front" in the south. In effect, he was making public the policy decisions which the Lao Dong Party had made during the preceding months. From the tone and temper of Le Duan's address it was apparent that the Vietcong insurrection was about to move into the stage of open war.

IV

Toward the end of January 1961, Hanoi radio announced that "various forces opposing the fascist Ngo Dinh Diem regime" had formed a "National Front for the Liberation of South Vietnam" (NLF) on December 20, 1960, and that it had issued a manifesto and 10-point political program. The language of both, as broadcast by Hanoi, made the Front's political parentage abundantly clear. The program's fourth point, for example, was "to carry out land rent reduction, guarantee the peasants' right to till their present plots of land, and redistribute communal land in preparation for land reform." To knowledgeable Vietnamese, such words as these made it chillingly obvious who was behind the Front and what lay in store for South Vietnam should it ever come to power.

On February 11, 1961, Hanoi devoted a second broadcast to the NLF's manifesto and program, blandly changing the language of both to tone down the more blatant Communist terminology of the initial version. However, even the milder second version (which became the "official" text) borrowed extensively from Le Duan's September speech and left little doubt about the Front's true sponsors or objectives.

After the Hanoi radio announcements, the Vietcong immediately began consolidating all of its activities—military as well as political—under the NLF banner and conducting intensive organizational activity in its name. A propaganda outlet, the Liberation News Agency, was promptly established and began pouring forth announcements and stories (replayed by Hanoi and by Communist media throughout the world) designed to portray the Front as a spontaneous, indigenous coalition of South Vietnamese nationalists. For the first year of its alleged existence, however, the NLF was a shadowy thing with no definable structure and a faceless, unidentified leadership.

The Front was but one of the two organizational instruments Hanoi had deemed essential to the successful pursuit of its political objectives south of the 17th parallel. The other—designedly less well known in the West but more important within South Vietnam itself—was first brought to light in a Liberation News Agency broadcast

January 13, 1962, which announced that a "conference of Marxist-Leninist delegates" had met in South Vietnam "during the last days of December 1961," and decided that "to fulfill their historic and glorious duty \* \* \* workers, peasants and laborers in South Vietnam need a vanguard group serving as a thoroughly revolutionary party." Accordingly, the conference had established the People's Revolutionary Party (PRP), which came into official existence on January 1, 1962.<sup>8</sup> The founders "warmly supported" the program of the NLF and "volunteered to join its ranks." In point of fact, the PRP immediately took complete control of the Front ("assumed the historic mission of playing the role of vanguard body to the southern revolution") and is currently referred to by Hanoi as "the soul" of the NLF.<sup>9</sup>

Captured Communist documents have since made it abundantly clear that the creation of the PRP involved what would be termed in American business parlance the "spin-off" of a wholly owned subsidiary. The PRP was and is, in fact, simply the southern branch of the Lao Dong. As one pertinent party directive put it: "The People's Revolutionary Party has only the appearance of an independent existence; actually, our party is nothing but the Lao Dong Party of Vietnam (Vietnam Communist Party) unified from north to south under the direction of the central executive committee of the party, the chief of which is President Ho."<sup>10</sup> The PRP serves as the principal vehicle for maintaining Lao Dong—i.e., North Vietnamese—control over the Vietcong insurgency.

As the organizational structure of the Vietcong movement has expanded over the past 4 years, its general outlines have become fairly well known. In the insurgency's initial phase (1954-59), the Communists retained the Vietminh's division of what is now South Vietnam into "Interzone V" (French Annam below the 17th parallel) and the "Nambo" (Cochin China), with each area under Hanoi's direct control. In late 1960 or early 1961, this arrangement was scrapped and field control over all aspects of the Vietcong insurgency vested in a still existing, single command headquarters, originally known as the Central Office for South Vietnam (or COSVN)—a term still in circulation) but now usually referred to by captured Vietcong as simply the PRP's Central Committee. This command entity, which also contains the headquarters of the NLF, is a mobile and sometimes peripatetic body, usually located in the extreme northwestern tip of Tay

<sup>8</sup> The only two of these "delegates" who have been subsequently identified are Vo Chi Chong, now a vice chairman of NLF's presidium and member of the PRP's executive committee, and Huynh Van Tam, now the NLF's representative in Algiers, where he devotes considerable time to cultivating Western newsmen, deceiving some of them about his own political background and the true nature of the organization he represents in a manner reminiscent of Chou En-lai's similar successes during the mid-1940's.

<sup>9</sup> These phrases appear in "The Vietnamese People's Revolutionary Party and Its Historic Mission of Liberating the South," an article in the January 1966 issue of the Lao Dong Party's theoretical journal Hoc Tap. The same article notes: "The experiences of the world and our country's revolutions have shown that in order to win the greatest success, the national democratic revolution must be led by a workers' revolutionary party"—i.e., a Communist Party.

<sup>10</sup> This particular document, dated Dec. 7, 1961, was captured in Ba Xuyen Province. Its text may be found, among other places, in the Department of State's white paper, "Ag-

Ninh Province in prudent proximity to the Cambodian border. Under this Central Committee headquarters, the Vietcong divide South Vietnam into five numbered military regions and one special zone for Saigon and its immediate environs. Each of the five regions, in turn, is divided into provinces; each province into districts; and each district into villages.<sup>11</sup> The Vietcong's provinces, districts, and villages are administratively comparable and roughly equivalent in area to those of the South Vietnamese Government. But their boundaries do not coincide, thus complicating Saigon's administrative problems in reacting to insurgent activities.

Though the outlines of the Vietcong's organizational structure are fairly well known, the identities of its leaders are not. They are faceless men veteran Communist revolutionaries who have made a lifetime practice of masking their identities under various aliases and noms de guerre and who take particular pains to stay hidden in the background in order to support the political fiction that the insurgency is directed by the NLF and the Front's ostensible officers.

At the 1962 Geneva Conference on Laos, a member of the North Vietnamese delegation inadvertently commented that the published roster of the Lao Dong Party's Central Committee did not include some members whose identities were kept secret because they were "directing military operations in South Vietnam." One of the four examples he cited was "Nguyen Van Cuc,"<sup>12</sup> which is one of the aliases used by the chairman of the PRP. This Lao Dong Central Committee member, whose true name we do not know, is probably the overall field director of the Vietcong insurgency in South Vietnam. The overall commander of Vietcong military forces (who would be a subordinate of Cuc's within the Communist command structure) is almost certainly the chairman of the (PRP) Central Committee's Military Committee—a man who uses the name Tran Nam Trung but whom several captured Vietcong cadre members have insisted is actually Lt. Gen. Tran Van Tra, a Deputy Chief of Staff of the North Vietnamese Army and an alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee. The director of all Vietcong activity in Vietcong Military Region 5 (the northernmost third of South Vietnam) is Nguyen Don, a major general in the North Vietnamese Army and another alternate member of the Lao Dong Central Committee, who in 1961 was commander of the North Vietnamese 305th Division but came south late that year or early in 1962. In short, not only does the PRP control all aspects of the Vietcong movement, including the NLF, and not only is it a subordinate echelon of the North Vietnamese Lao Dong Party, but the PRP's own leaders appear to be individuals who themselves occupy ranking positions within the Lao Dong Party hierarchy.

As indicated above, for the first year of its existence the NLF was as shadowy and faceless an organization as the PRP is today. It was allegedly created "after a conference of representatives of various forces opposing the fascist regime in South Vietnam," but the identities of these representatives or the "forces" they represented were never specified. The myth of the Front was not fleshed out with public organizational substance or overt leadership until after the PRP was presented as its vanguard element. The NLF

<sup>11</sup> In Vietnam, a "village" is not a cluster of huts but an administrative entity roughly comparable to an American township.

<sup>12</sup> P. J. Honey, "North Vietnam's Workers' Party and South Vietnam's People's Revolutionary Party," Pacific Affairs Quarterly, p. 383.

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now claims to be a coalition of over 40 "associated organizations" which, collectively, purport to represent virtually all shades and strata of South Vietnamese political and social life. This coalition includes three "political parties": the PRP, the "Democratic Party" and the "Radical Socialist Party." (The latter two bear almost exactly the same names as the two minor parties allowed to exist in North Vietnam and are obviously intended to play similar roles.) In their present name or form, virtually none of its affiliated organizations antedates the founding of the NLF itself, many almost certainly exist only on paper, and a careful analysis of the NLF's own propaganda makes it clear that a goodly number have identical officers, directorates, and staffs. Some of these organizations, however, have acquired substance after the fact, as it were, and now play important roles in the NLF's efforts to organize and control the rural populace.

It is fairly easy to devise an organizational structure capable of lending verisimilitude to a political fiction, doubly so if one is trying to deceive a foreign audience unversed in local political affairs. Fleshing this structure out with live, known individuals to occupy posts of public prominence is considerably more difficult. The Vietcong obviously hoped to attract to the NLF South Vietnamese of personal stature and renown, preferably individuals not immediately identifiable as Communists or Communist sympathizers, who could enhance the Front's prestige and political attractiveness and provide a more or less innocent facade behind which the NLF's Communist masters could operate in secure obscurity. To date the Vietcong have been notably unsuccessful in this regard, though the full measure of their failure is far better appreciated within South Vietnam itself than it is abroad. No Vietnamese of what could accurately be described as significant personal prestige or professional standing—not even one of known leftist persuasion—has ever been willing to associate himself publicly with the NLF or lend it the use of his name.

The NLF's first Central Committee was not announced until March 1962, well over a year after the Front's supposedly spontaneous creation. Though the committee purportedly had 52 members, the NLF was able to come up with only 31 names, most of which were, virtually unknown even within South Vietnam. The 41-member second (and current) Central Committee, announced in January 1964, is equally lacking in distinction.

The Chairman of the NLF's Presidium and Central Committee is Nguyen Huu Tho, a former provincial lawyer with a long record of activity in Communist-sponsored causes but of little political repute or professional standing among his former colleagues at the South Vietnamese bar, who generally categorize him as having been an "avocat sans brevets." The NLF's present Secretary General (also the Secretary General of the "Democratic Party" and the Chairman of the NLF's Saigon Zone Committee) is Huynh Tan Phat, usually described in NLF propaganda as an "architect," though one would be hard pressed to point to any edifice he has designed. From 1945 until 1948 he apparently served as a member of the Vietminh/Vietcong Executive Committee in Nambo and as the Communists' propaganda chief for their Saigon Special Zone. The NLF's First Secretary General (also the Secretary General of the "Radical Socialist Party") was Nguyen Van Hieu, now its principal traveling representative abroad. A former journalist and teacher (some say of biology, some of mathematics), Hieu has been a Communist propagandist since the late 1940's. The Chairman of the NLF's External Relations (i.e. foreign affairs) is Buu Kiem, a Central Committee member

who served briefly as Secretary General after Hieu and before Phat. Described in official NLF biographies as an "intellectual and ardent patriot," Kiem has spent most of the past two decades as a leader in various Communist-front youth groups. Such figures as these are the best the Front has been able to come up with to staff its most prominent public offices. Their organizational and revolutionary talents may be impressive, but their personal stature and prestige among the South Vietnamese people are not.

v

Over the past 4 years the Vietcong have labored mightily to improve their image beyond South Vietnam's borders and to enlist a broad spectrum of international support for their cause; to develop their organizational structure within South Vietnam, thus strengthening their internal political position; and to expand their military effort, to facilitate achievement of their political goals and if possible to generate an aura of invincibility capable of breaking their adversaries' will to continue the struggle.

The image-building campaign abroad has been designed to publicize the NLF and inflate its prestige and reputation. Its goal has been to get the NLF generally accepted as an indigenous South Vietnamese political coalition (admittedly with some Communist members) which sprang up spontaneously to combat the harsh excesses of the U.S.-supported Diem regime, and which seeks only peace, democracy and reunification as provided for in the Geneva agreements. Though moral—and, to some extent perhaps, physical—support may be afforded by North Vietnam and other fraternal socialist states (so the argument runs), the NLF is basically an independent political entity with a policy and will of its own. This campaign has been waged through the propaganda disseminated by the Liberation News Agency, replayed and echoed by Communist (and non-Communist) media throughout the world; through a steady flow of messages from the Front to foreign governments and heads of state (particularly of neutralist Afro-Asian nations); by ever increasing attendance at foreign conferences and meetings (generally Communist or leftist sponsored) by a small handful of indefatigable NLF representatives; and by the establishment of permanent NLF "missions" in Havana, Peking, Moscow, Prague, East Berlin, Budapest, Cairo, Jakarta, and Algiers. All of this activity has profited from the fact that knowledge of the realities of political life in South Vietnam does not extend much beyond its frontiers; all of it has been guided by a keen awareness of the effectiveness of incessant repetition in converting myth to assumed reality.

Throughout South Vietnam, the Vietcong have developed and employed the NLF apparatus in their intensive effort to organize the population (especially the rural population), involve it in their insurgency campaign and bring it under their political domination. The detailed application of this effort varies from locality to locality, and is materially influenced by such local factors as the relative degree of Vietcong strength in the area. The objective, however, is always to secure total participation and total involvement on the part of the local population in order to establish total Vietcong control. They endeavor to persuade—and, if conditions permit, compel—every inhabitant of a given area to join and work actively in some NLF component organization. Farmers are encouraged or forced to join the Liberation Peasants' Association; women, the Liberation Women's Association; children, the Liberation Youth Association. Where Vietcong control is strong, no one escapes the net. Physically fit males not sent off to some other Vietcong military unit serve in the local militia squad or self-defense force. Men help make bamboo stakes and traps or

dig up roads to harass government forces. They serve as informants and couriers, or go on purchasing expeditions to nearby government-controlled market towns. Everyone participates and ensures that his neighbor does so as well. All of this activity is coordinated and directed by local NLF committees which where circumstances permit, assume the prerogatives and functions of local government. These local committees in turn are directed by superior echelons, capped, at least ostensibly, by the central committee of the NLF itself.

The NLF's organizational structure is paralleled and controlled at each echelon by a complementary PRP structure. Under the general command of its central committee, the PRP is organized on a geographic basis through the various regions, provinces, and districts down to the village level. Each geographic echelon has a directing committee responsible for controlling all PRP—hence all Vietcong, including NLF—activities within its area. These committees vary in size and organizational complexity, even among equivalent geographic echelons, but each one has a single chairman and several subordinate members or subcommittees with specific functional responsibilities. The number and nomenclature of these functional subcommittees also varies from area to area, but they normally cover military affairs, economic and financial affairs, and what the Communists term "front affairs and civilian proselytizing," whose chairman is responsible for controlling all NLF activity in that area. If the PRP organization at that echelon is sufficiently well developed, he in turn will have subordinate members of his PRP subcommittee to direct each of the local associations affiliated with the NLF. Though captured documents indicate that the Vietcong try to keep the level of overt PRP participation below two-fifths of the total membership of any given NLF component, the organizational structure we have just described (reinforced by a network of covert PRP cells throughout the NLF) keeps all components of the NLF at every level under complete PRP control.

The Vietcong's terrorist and military apparatus was developed and is directed by this same organizational structure, which insures that armed activity at all levels is rigidly subordinated to political objectives and kept under tight party control. The Vietcong military establishment now has over 90,000 full-time troops (including over 12,000 North Vietnamese regulars) augmented and supported by something over 100,000 paramilitary personnel and part-time guerrillas. This whole force, however, was built up for political reasons, to serve political ends. The Vietcong political apparatus was at work laying the foundations for insurgency long before there was even so much as a Vietcong hamlet self-defense squad.

The director of the military affairs subcommittee (mentioned above) is frequently also the commander of the Vietcong force attached to that geographic echelon. Village directing committees have village platoons under their control; district committees, district companies; provincial committees, provincial battalions. Regional committees have forces of regimental and multi-regimental size at their disposal, and the whole Vietcong military establishment is subject to the direction of PRP's Central Committee. Throughout this military structure, the same basic principles of organization and command relationship are uniformly applied. There is no such thing as a Vietcong military unit of any size independent of the party's political apparatus or free from tight political control. Probably no more than a third of the Vietcong forces are party members, but by virtue of its organizational mechanism the PRP controls them in the same way that it controls the National Liberation Front.

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An understanding of the Vietcong's organizational structure enables us to recognize the real significance and function of the more than 50,000 persons infiltrated into South Vietnam since the Lao Dong Party's 1959 decision to pursue its objective of political conquest by waging insurgent war. Until mid to late 1963 these infiltrators were virtually all ethnic southerners drawn from the pool of regrouped Vietminh forces and supporters taken north in 1954. They were not foot soldiers or cannon fodder (at least not until Hanoi began sending in whole North Vietnamese units in late 1964 or early 1965). Instead they were disciplined, trained and indoctrinated cadres and technicians. They became the squad leaders, platoon leaders, political officers, staff officers, unit commanders, weapons and communications specialists who built the Vietcong's military force into what it is today. They also became the village, district, provincial, and regional committee chiefs and key committee members who built the Vietcong's political apparatus.

The earlier arrivals had had at least 5 days of indoctrination and training in North Vietnam, or elsewhere in the Communist bloc, before departing on their southern missions; some of the later arrivals have had nearly a decade of such preparation. Until the recent sharp rise in Vietcong battlefield casualties, approximately a third of all the personnel in Vietcong military units at and above the district company level were "returnees" trained in the north. At least half of the membership of most PRP district committees, and an even larger proportion at higher echelons, also appear to be "returnees." Without this infiltration from the north, in short, the present Vietcong organization could never have been developed.

## VI

The Vietcong insurgency is clearly a masterpiece of revolutionary organization, but its total effectiveness and real political strength are extremely difficult to assess. The bulk of the Vietcong's organizational efforts have been expended in rural areas and it is there that they are strongest. (The government controls all of the cities, major towns, and provincial capitals and all but a handful of the district seats.) There are indications, however, that sharply rising Vietcong taxation rates, increasingly frequent, resort to impressment to secure troops, and the Vietcong's manifest inability to deliver on political promises of earlier years are all beginning to erode their base of rural support. During the past year nearly 800,000 refugees fled from the hinterland to the vicinity of government-controlled towns. Some of these were fleeing from natural disasters, some from the simple hazards of war (though the direction in which persons of this category opted to flee is significant), but many were obviously endeavoring to get out from under the Vietcong. Furthermore, in assessing Communist claims of control it should be noted that over half of the rural population voted in the May 1965 provincial elections, despite Vietcong orders to boycott them.

In the cities, the Vietcong have an obvious terrorist capability but are politically quite weak—a fact of which they are aware and which, according to captured documents, causes them considerable embarrassment. They have been unable to turn the urban political ferment of the past 3 years to any obvious immediate advantage. None of the participants in the genuine social revolution now taking place in the urban areas of South Vietnam has sought Vietcong support or entertained overtures of political alliance. Though they have undoubtedly penetrated such groups as the Buddhists and the students the Vietcong have made no visible headway in subverting or bringing them under control. Finally, although the Vietcong organization are in the cities was demonstrated

twice last fall (on Oct. 15 and Dec. 19) when two public calls by the Vietcong for a "general strike" went totally unheeded and produced no visible change whatsoever in the pattern of urban life.

Despite its leaders' obvious organizational talents and revolutionary skills, the Vietcong movement is beset with a number of fundamental weaknesses. It has no universally appealing theme in any way comparable to the Vietminh's espousal of anti-French nationalism. Persistent propaganda efforts to portray the Americans as successor imperialists to the French have simply never taken hold. The concept of reunification has relatively little appeal for peasants who regard someone from the next province as an alien. The idea of reunification does appeal to politically minded urban elements, particularly to refugees from the north, but within such circles there is a great reluctance to accept the Vietcong's identification of reunification with political domination by the present Hanoi regime. Having lived through the sequence of historical events we have outlined, politically conscious Vietnamese are not easily deceived by the NLF's pretensions to independence and freedom from northern control, particularly since the military side of the Vietcong insurgency is now being waged with an ever larger number of North Vietnamese troops.

The current struggle in South Vietnam is a historically rooted, political phenomenon of infinite complexity, particularly since it involves an externally directed Communist drive for power interlarded with a genuine indigenous social revolution. In analyzing such a phenomenon, "truth" is often a function of one's angle of vision, and myth is not always easy to distinguish from reality. Despite the fact that there are many aspects of the current situation in Vietnam concerning which confident assertion is a mark of ignorance or disingenuous intent, there are certain aspects of the insurgency, and of the Vietcong structure through which it is being waged, which are not open to intellectually honest dispute.

There are unquestionably many non-Communists heroically serving in various components of the National Liberation Front out of a desire to redress genuine grievances or in the honest belief that they are thereby helping to build a better political structure for their native land. As an organization, however, the NLF is a contrived political mechanism with no indigenous roots, subject to the ultimate control of the Lao Dong Party in Hanoi.

The relationship between the Vietcong and the DRV is not that of politically like-minded allies. Instead, it is essentially the relationship between a field command and its parent headquarters. Such relationships are never free from elements of tension and discord. Within the Vietcong movement, and even within its controlling hierarchy, there are unquestionably varying judgments (at least privately held ones) about the wisdom of present tactics and the best course of future action. (There are obvious differences of opinion regarding the struggle in Vietnam even within the Lao Dong Party Politburo.) Nevertheless, the whole Vietcong organizational structure and chain of command has been carefully designed to minimize the risks of insubordination. Though for tactical reasons the overt propaganda outlets and spokesmen of the NLF sometimes take political positions which differ at least in emphasis from those emanating from Hanoi, the chances of the Vietcong's developing or adopting a genuinely independent political line in opposition to orders received from North Vietnam through the Lao Dong Party apparatus are slight indeed.

Finally, although the Vietcong organization are in the cities was demonstrated

mechanism which it controls has no serious claim to being considered, as Hanoi insists, the "sole legitimate voice of the South Vietnamese people." Were it ever to be accepted as such, the record of what has happened in North Vietnam in the years since 1951 makes it abundantly clear what lies in store for the more than 16 million Vietnamese who live south of the 17th parallel, especially for those who have resolutely fought against the Vietcong insurgency from its inception.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that I may yield on the same terms to the distinguished senior Senator from Florida.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. HOLLAND. Mr. President, I shall of course vote for the pending bill. I supported the bill in committee. I support the bill now.

Mr. President, the Secretary of Agriculture, the Honorable Orville L. Freeman, spoke at the Governor's Day luncheon of the Florida Citrus Showcase sponsored by the Florida Citrus Mutual in Winter Haven, Fla., on Friday, February 18, 1966, just a week after his return from Vietnam. His speech related in the main to his observations in Vietnam, with particular reference to food and the agricultural situation there.

I feel that Secretary Freeman's speech throws much light on conditions in Vietnam which are directly related to the contents of the pending bill. I therefore ask unanimous consent to have the Secretary's speech printed in the Record in full at this point as a part of my remarks.

There being no objection, the speech was ordered to be printed in the Record, as follows:

SECRETARY OF AGRICULTURE ORVILLE L. FREEMAN'S SPEECH AT THE GOVERNOR'S DAY LUNCHEON OF THE FLORIDA CITRUS SHOWCASE, SPONSORED BY THE FLORIDA CITRUS MUTUAL IN WINTER HAVEN, FLA., FEBRUARY 18, 1966

Mr. Toastmaster, distinguished officers and leaders of Citrus Mutual, of the Citrus Showcase, the mayor of this lovely community, members of your State cabinet, your State treasurer, your commissioner of agriculture, members of the State legislature, leaders of the citrus industry, ladies, and gentlemen, I am delighted to be here. I am flattered that you would ask me back again. I was here with you about a year and a half ago and enjoyed it thoroughly and am certainly pleased to be here once again.

I want, today, to talk to you a little bit in broad terms about agriculture in the world in which we live. Agriculture is the key to world peace. Agriculture is the key to the victory in Vietnam.

First, however, I want to express my most sincere commendation to you, your organizations and to this industry, to the leadership, the foresight you have shown, to your excellent job of marketing. I remember quite vividly about a year ago, when your distinguished executive vice president, Bob Rutledge, who serves you so effectively, came to my office and reviewed and discussed with me some of your marketing plans. And I listened with special interest because I have been concerned. You had learned how, as our agriculture has generally, to produce mightily. Sometimes that really challenges us in this country.

It is a blessed thing for which we ought to be truly thankful, but we haven't always learned how to live with that abundance, to get it, and how to effectively get it where it is needed at the terms and con-

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ditions and at the price where people will utilize it. And so to note the excellent progress in you: new plant, the fine reception of the new concentrate, to note some of the good work you have done in marketing abroad, I am glad to have the chance as the Secretary of Agriculture to come here and say to you, well done.

A week ago today, I was in a little village in South Vietnam at a training camp called Vung Tau. I was sitting on a folding chair beside a canal listening to one of the most impressive men I have ever heard in my life. Dressed in a simple, black pajama, he outlined for me the course of training of the rural construction cadres, made up of peasant boys who volunteered to go back into their home provinces and villages to hold those villages, to pacify those villages, after the military has taken them away from the Vietcong.

He was a tremendously impressive fellow. Some had likened him to a saint. He said in a very soft voice that these young boys are looking for some meaning in their lives which had been wrecked by war. All their lives had been spent in a nation engaged in war. They have been pretty cynical, generally, as to their stake in its future. And he told a little legend, very simple, about the beautiful lady and the dragon and how an accommodation between the lady and the dragon was developed and sustained. The spiritual side of life was the beautiful lady, the materialistic and powerful side of life was the dragon, and the harmony of the two was what gave meaning to life.

He went on with some other legends, and then said in a soft voice, "to the Vietnamese, this is much more understandable than the material of communism. The boys who have gone out of here have learned to be for something. They go out to secure and to hold these villages and fight to hold them if necessary."

And then he developed some of the symbolism which was a powerful part of this training course. He gave me one of their graduation pins. It has a T-H symbol on it, somewhat like our own 4-H Club symbol. He drew a hammer and a sickle on the blackboard, and then put the T-H over it. The hammer and the sickle were obliterated and he said these boys are obliterating that hammer and sickle everywhere around Vietnam.

We then looked at the rifle range. These men, he told me, fire more ammunition than the regular troops that are trained for actual battle. Then we saw the classrooms where they get general exposure to health, vocational, and agricultural training.

At the conclusion of their rural construction training, the night before they graduate, they sit out all night long and make up their minds whether they want to take a pledge which is part of the graduation ceremony next day, and take on the responsibility for caring for the ideals which he outlined; self-discipline, service, honesty, mercy to the old, the sick and the needy. This was couched in the traditional Vietnamese terms rather than ours but the meaning was exactly the same.

He said that during the new year celebration, the big ceremony of Vietnam, down the road in a single military camp they had 50 percent AWOL; in a military police training school they had 25 percent AWOL. But there wasn't a single man in the rural construction cadre who left. I was tremendously interested in this training center, because they have a workable system and it's based on hard experience that can win peasant support and ultimately win the war in Vietnam.

The military struggle is a bitter, difficult, complicated one. You don't know who the enemy is a good share of the time. We have the power and the resources and the fighting capacity to win the fighting war. But that doesn't do much good if a week

later the Vietcong infiltrate the area and take the village all over again. And that's what is happening. What's got to be done is this: We've got to win the hearts and minds of those poor people who have been promised and promised and promised and abused and decimated all these years.

Last year, 1,500 local government officials were brutally murdered, some of them tortured and captured, simply because they were doing a good job. The Vietcong is on an organized, purposeful program of terror and destruction. This would be the equivalent in the United States of 50,000 mayors and county commissioners. Now if 50,000 local officials in this country were murdered in one year—it's anybody's guess as to what it would mean. Now these boys who go out of this camp are to work with the military in areas being pacified or already pacified. They are to go into an area in teams of 59 men. They are highly trained; highly armed. They know how to use those weapons. They are highly motivated to help the peasants, but they are ready to fight. But they don't go into the countryside to fight, they go there to build.

And as Gen. Nguyen Duc Thang, Minister of Rural Construction, a very impressive young Vietnamese general, said to me, "we don't go to hit and run, we go to hit and stay." And they go to the villages—their home villages in many cases—and they seek to get close to where those people live; to let them know that their government believes in them, wants to help them, to give them a stake in life.

I said to the general, "Well, now, I am the head of a cadre and I'm going into a village that has just been reclaimed. What's the first thing I do?" He said to me, "You keep your mouth shut." I thought that was a pretty good answer. He said when those folks want some help, you help them to help themselves. You don't give them anything; because if you give them something, it's not really theirs. If the Vietcong destroy it, it is not their loss. But if you help them build something and the Vietcong destroys it, then it is their loss.

About 20,000 have been trained already, and their training will be stepped up. The Vietnamese Government has selected a number of villages to be pacified with the help of these cadres. This is a hardheaded, hard-hitting, systematic job of pacification. And it is, as I say, a thoroughly planned and purposeful one. It carries within it, I think, the formula of victory.

Now this is the meaning of the spirit of Honolulu. I have just been back a few days and I have been rather shocked to find a good bit of cynicism about this in some quarters. I have difficulty understanding that because in Honolulu the President dramatized for the attention of the entire world the best in principles, the best in standards, that this Nation has; that we built ourselves to greatness with service, humanitarianism, concern for the people.

This is a second front of a two-front war. We have to win the tough, hard, difficult military part of this war. But of equal importance has to be the second part, what they call a social revolution in Vietnam. The word revolution has a much more positive cast to it, and it is broadly used, to give an identity, to give a meaning, to give a purpose to the lives of those people so that when the Vietcong come in, the people will notify the authorities so they can be rooted out. If they hide the Vietcong, if they protect them, if they don't report them, then it is an almost impossible task. So there is a two-front, sharp, clear objective—an objective in which I think we can feel pride, that we as a nation go out not only to stop the onrush of communism, but also go on to start and carry forward the onrush of human and social progress.

I submit to you here today that that won't

be done if agriculture is not in the forefront in that effort. I said when I returned that in this war, fertilizer is just as important as bullets, and so it is. The essentials for effective agricultural production are ready, and we can make striking progress in agriculture in Vietnam.

What I found, really, was far beyond my expectations in light of the hardships under which those people live. If you ever wanted to see a justification for some of our dollars to be spent on helping other people, take a look at agriculture in Vietnam. It has only been 10 years and yet those little farmers, most of them tenants, or landowners with very small holdings, are using very modern practices of improved seed, fertilizer, chemicals, and pesticides, disease control in animals, and all the rest, whenever they can get it. They don't want it free. They want to buy it. But so far we haven't done as good a job as we should, in making it available. But where it has been available, they make every effort to get it.

I talked to one peasant who walked 15 miles with a basket on his head to buy 50 pounds of fertilizer and get a little package of seed and walked 15 miles back to his little hamlet. He knew about fertilizer. He knew about improved seed. All he wanted was a chance to use them, because, when he does, his yield of rice goes up 50 percent. And when yields go up 50 percent, he can buy his kids some clothes, and they have a little money in the village to build a little school. They then build a little better home. Then they have a stake in something. Then when the Vietcong come in after it, they are prepared to fight, and inform, and resist. What we need to do is to integrate agriculture effectively in the forefront of the second front of this two-front war.

Last Sunday, I was on the coast about in the midlands in Vietnam in an area called Phan Rang. I stood on a little plot of land on the coast that was plain sand. It had been sand dunes. It had been government land. It had been levelled off. Chinese technicians from Taiwan were there. They worked with the Vietnamese farmers on new techniques in growing vegetables. An onion, an adaptation of the Granex onion out of Texas that had been adapted by one of our plant technicians—took them 4 years to do it—was being planted on that hectare of land the peasant had gotten as a part of the land reform program. He netted on that 2½ acres 200,000 piastres—that's \$2,000 in American money. Growing rice in the same area, they were netting about \$20 an acre.

That peasant had a little irrigation system. He and a dozen others had gone together to buy a little gasoline engine pump for a shallow well. They had put in a little irrigation works—some shallow ditches. We saw the water flowing out. Onions, garlic and other kinds of vegetables were growing profusely. I had a picture taken with him with a basket of onions and vegetables besides, of all things, a bright red motorbike. He had made a little money, the first thing he wanted was a motorbike. Comparatively, you'd buy a Cadillac. And maybe he will one day, too. But a motorbike is a desirable status symbol; it means transportation.

And in this same area, I went to the village where he lived. They had a little self-help program to build a warehouse. The material was made available to them by the Vietnamese Government with our help. The people built the warehouse themselves. They were renting space in it to dry garlic. The rent was being paid. The village had made a little money and they were putting it in a school and a health clinic.

This was the only place I went in Vietnam where the province chief could travel at night out in the countryside. Most of the time they would go to see the people. This fellow said to me, "I don't bother these people who are working



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in the fields by going to see them in the daytime. I go out and see them in the night, when they are available."

He was able to do that because his area was pacified. If the Vietcong move into that area he would be notified. He was a tough soldier; but he was very good with these people, and it is not a normal mandarin attitude, you know, to say, "I adapt myself to the people." Politicians do that in the United States. They do not normally do that in Asia. But this philosophy was going forward. He could go out at night, because if anybody infiltrated that area, he got the word. And when he got the word, he got the troops out there and the Vietcong didn't last very long. This was an example of what can be done. It isn't easy.

These peasants have been promised to death. They are pretty skeptical; pretty cynical. They have been terrorized, brutalized, murdered, taxed by both sides, run off their land, run back on their land, and they have been in this war for 20 years. But I feel, really, that the sense of hopelessness and complacency that seems to permeate some parts of this country is not permanent. There is a base, for real hope; that we can win this war; that we can help these people. This nation can be a real bastion for freedom if we remember that this is a two-front war, that force alone is ineffective, that to go along with it you have to have service, accomplishment, and build a stake in society.

A lot of people have asked me, "What about these young generals? Do they mean it and will they do it?" It's hard to tell. You can only make a judgment.

I spent 3 hours in an airplane with General Ky. He is 35 years old. He is the Prime Minister. He was the commanding general of their air corps; very colorful, very smart, no particular background in government as such. I met all the corps commanders and all the top generals. The ruling group is about a dozen. I found them, without exception, bright and alert. They said the right words, and they said them with feeling.

For example, General Ky said a number of times: "It is a military war and a war for the hearts of our people. We cannot win one without winning the other. But the war for the hearts of the people is more than a military tactic. It is a moral principle. We are trying to bring about a true social revolution. We are instituting a program for a better society."

He then went on to say, "I think that the present government by and large has the confidence of the people. I think it has a greater measure of support than any of the previous governments. But that's not enough. We must have a government which has been freely elected by the people. Despite the many tasks we have on our hands today, I feel we can take on one more. And one, which next to winning the war I speak about, is most important and that is building democracy in Vietnam."

Prime Minister Ky said extemporaneously when the Vice President left Saigon: "I am sure Mr. HUMPHREY, prior to his visit here, was not convinced of the ability of the young generals, sometimes called the young Turks, to rule our nation. I'm sure that now he must recognize that we are more civilian than the civilians, and we love freedom more than freemen and desire democracy more than you do in the United States."

The Prime Minister grabbed a microphone in Honolulu at the conclusion of the press conference and said, "I'm not a war lord. I'm tired of fighting. I've been shot at all my life. I risk assassination every day. I want to win this war and help my people." He said, "I don't have a car. I don't have any property," and went on to say that his stake was one of service.

Only time will tell how these and other three young generals are.

I was impressed with them, with their ability and their dedication but also with the fact that they are a smart, tough bunch. They had to be to survive. Some of them have been wounded six times. They were fighting in the jungles almost before they could walk. To survive that and the political wars, the coups and the rest, they have to have something on the ball. And they know as sure as day follows night that they can't win that war, repel that invasion, and make Vietnam a free nation unless they can earn the support and loyalty of their people. And so for that reason if for no other reason, they are going about their business. They don't do it always like we do. They are not as efficient and effective as your Commissioner of Agriculture here, for example, and your State Treasurer. Not as experienced in government, but they are tough minded, alert, and determined.

I went to Vietnam and took with me at the President's instructions 10 of the best agricultural specialists in this country in the fields of crops, chemicals, livestock, irrigation, and fishing—and we came back feeling positive; not overwhelmingly optimistic, building glowing word pictures, but feeling that there is a real purpose and that this is not a hopeless morass; that this war can be won and that it is vitally important that it should be won. We also felt real pride in our own profession of agriculture, because it is the key. Agriculture is the key in Vietnam, as it is the key around the world in the great race taking place between food and people.

On February 10, the President sent to the Congress a great message, a food-for-freedom message, calling on this Nation to mobilize its agricultural resources and to wheel them into action to help those nations who would help themselves so that this race can be won and the world will be able to feed itself. This is the greatest challenge we face down the road.

All of us who work in this great area, then, work not only to serve our Nation and our communities. We stand right at the heart-beat of the future well-being of mankind. A world that isn't fed, a world plagued and dogged by famine and desperation and malnutrition, is never going to be a peaceful world. So as you skillfully carry forward your work in this great industry, we join in seeking to use the power that comes with this great capacity to produce and as a great free Nation to use it effectively, so other people can have as great a stake in freedom as we have and there is no stake where there is no food.

The challenge down the road is a great one but is one that I think we can meet. I came back from Vietnam challenged but reassured. We'll win this one as we have won them before.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, will the Senator from Pennsylvania permit us to have the yeas and nays on final passage?

The PRESIDING OFFICER. Is there a sufficient second? There is a sufficient second, and the yeas and nays are ordered.

Mr. CLARK. Mr. President, there has been some discussion in the last couple of minutes about the possible bombing or mining of Haiphong Harbor. I should like to call to the attention of the Senators the statement made by Secretary McNamara on page 177 of the record where he testified that since the tonnage required for the support of enemy troops in South Vietnam is relatively small, the function of mining the harbor of Haiphong—and I imagine it would be the same result from bombing the harbor of Haiphong—would not materially affect the course of the war itself.

I wonder if the committee is in accord with the view of the Secretary, that it would not presently be useful from our overall point of view to attack Haiphong either by bombing or mining.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. That view was stated in an indirect fashion by General Wheeler, as I recall, in his testimony before the committee. I must say, with all due respect to General Wheeler—and I do have very genuine respect for him—that in my opinion it flies in the face of commonsense to say that the closing of the harbor at Haiphong has a lower priority than the bombing of the petroleum dumps, the petroleum for which has come in through Haiphong Harbor.

It seems to me it would be self-evident even to a lay mind that it would be more effective to close the stopper of a bottle than to pour out the contents and set the bottle back down to be refilled. That is all that would be accomplished by clearing the petroleum dumps, because the next day a tanker could come into Haiphong and replenish these dumps.

There are a number of ways to close this harbor other than bombing. I am not committed altogether to closing the harbor by bombing. It so happens that there is a narrow waterway leading into the harbor. Two dredges work there constantly. Those dredges could be sunk by naval gunfire to close the harbor for a short period. It could be mined, or it could, if desired, be bombed; or a naval blockade could be established with a half dozen destroyers.

But I think it is self-evident that the closing of the harbor itself would be more injurious to the war effort of the North Vietnamese than bombing supplies, even as important as a petroleum dump, which can be immediately replenished by another tanker coming into that harbor. It simply does not make sense to me to say that closing the harbor has a much lower priority than these petroleum dumps.

Mr. CLARK. So to that extent, the Senator disagrees with Secretary McNamara?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Oh, yes, indeed, I disagree flatly with him on that point, and also disagree with General Wheeler.

I wish to add that at one time all the Chiefs of Staff thought that closing the harbor at Haiphong should have a very high priority, and it is only of late that there has been any disagreement among the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Mr. SYMINGTON. Mr. President, will the Senator yield?

Mr. CLARK. Gladly.

Mr. SYMINGTON. The Senator from Georgia brought up the point I intended to bring up, there is disagreement in testimony before the committee. So I hope the American people will be informed, and information not classified. There is disagreement among the military as to the importance of closing the harbor at Haiphong.

Why should they not close that harbor? Only two railroads come down from China. One which we have not been hitting since the resumption is the railroad from the industrial section of

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Manchuria into Vietnam. The other railroad comes from west to east. From the standpoint of commonsense and economy, why would they use that? But we have been hitting that latter railroad. There are a few roads which in the main I understand are not in too good shape.

But nobody could know what is coming through the Haiphong Harbor. Testimony before the committee admits, a very large majority of the oil moving into North Vietnam comes through the harbor at Haiphong. Obviously, those trucks that go down the Ho Chi Minh Trail must have that oil to be used. Statements have been made that it is thought relatively little ammunition comes through the harbor; but who knows what is in the boxes on the docks of that harbor? There is no reason for anybody to extrapolate what the many ships going into that harbor have on them. Anybody who looks at the map knows the Haiphong Harbor is the easiest, least expensive, and most effective way of getting in the tremendous amounts of supplies coming into North Vietnam to kill our troops in South Vietnam. If anybody does not think most of it is coming through the harbor, where else it is coming from?

The answer we hear is, "They don't need very much." But I was down in the Mekong Delta in recent weeks, and saw hundreds of magnificent weapons—made mostly in China, but also quite a few from Soviet Russia—on exhibit in the center of the town square in Can Tho. That exhibit showed to my satisfaction where those weapons were coming from. If they do not come over the railroad we are not attacking, and if they do not come from the harbor, where are they coming from? As we know, the Communists do not have any logistic support in the way of air power.

Mr. CLARK. I say to my friend, the Senator from Georgia, I have only one or two questions more. The hour is getting late; we are almost ready to vote. I should like, if I can, to finish it up.

On page 178, the Secretary of Defense testified that the industries in North Vietnam contribute very little to the supplies used in the south for the prosecution of the war.

He also said that wiping out the entire industry of North Vietnam would have no measurable effect upon their capability to furnish the supplies they are presently supplying to the Communist forces in South Vietnam.

Does the Senator agree with that?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. No; I do not agree with it in toto. I think it is substantially correct. But I have information and we have had some evidence that there is an iron foundry in the vicinity of Hanoi, which manufactures literally millions of hand grenades that are being used in this war.

With that exception, I think that the Secretary's statement is approximately correct.

Mr. CLARK. I thank the Senator from Georgia for his patience. I have one final question.

It appears in the hearings that if we were to destroy the petroleum depots in North Vietnam, and they got no fuel for their trucks in the south, they—that is, the enemy—could move the quantities of supplies now being moved by animal and by manpower. At page 299 of the hearings, Admiral McDonald asserted that the Vietcong in South Vietnam need few petroleum items, because they walk everywhere.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Well, that is true when one measures their equipment against the vehicles that are operated in modern warfare.

But petroleum is still a very essential element of war. Most of the material that is carried from Haiphong down into South Vietnam over the many branches of the Ho Chi Minh trail is carried by trucks. We have had the good luck once or twice lately to find a truck convoy exposed on the roads and attack it from the air, and have destroyed a great many of the trucks.

Those people, however, are resourceful. We had evidence before the committee that they were using elephants to carry supplies, and that they were using large numbers of people, bearers, who can carry three or four times their own weight.

Mr. CLARK. And bicycles.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes; that they would put on a bicycle 300 or 400 pounds of equipment, and push it along.

They are very resourceful people. They have been engaged in a war of this nature now for more than 20 years.

Mr. CLARK. Since the Japanese moved in.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. They have had a great deal of experience in it, and are probably the most efficient guerrilla fighters on earth today, and would compare favorably with any in recorded history.

Mr. CLARK. I thank my friend the Senator from Georgia, and I yield the floor.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I suggest the absence of a quorum.

Mr. SCOTT. Mr. President, will the Senator withhold his request, and yield to me for a moment?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield to the Senator from Pennsylvania.

Mr. SCOTT. I mention to the distinguished Senator from Georgia that the distinguished Senator from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON] asked a question which has not been answered, and I would appreciate the help of the Senator in supplying an answer.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I thank the Senator for the compliment implied.

Mr. SCOTT. I am sure the Senator has information which would be helpful and useful.

The reference made by the junior Senator from Pennsylvania was to page 178, the testimony of Secretary McNamara, wherein he stated:

The industry in the north is so small that it plays a very little role in the economy of the north, and I think any of the analysts who have studied the problem would say it could be completely eliminated and not re-

duce in any substantial way the contribution of the North to South Vietnam.

Paraphrasing the Senator from Missouri, he said that if they are getting their material through Haiphong, it does not amount to anything, and if North Vietnam is not contributing anything of substance to South Vietnam, meaning to the South Vietnamese, the anti-

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Vietcong.

Mr. SCOTT. Yes, the Vietcong, in other words—then said the Senator from Missouri, where are the Vietcong—if I can paraphrase him further—where are the Vietcong getting their supplies from?

What would the Senator from Georgia say to that?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I would say that they are getting it from a great many sources. As I stated a few moments ago, undoubtedly thousands of hand grenades are being made in North Vietnam. An iron foundry, I believe, is located on the outskirts of Hanoi, or it could be on the outskirts of Haiphong, but they do have one iron foundry which does make some equipment; but, the great bulk of their equipment, all of their sophisticated equipment, such as 50 caliber machine guns, 55 millimeter recoilless rifles, their burp guns, and rifles—some of which have telescopic sights which can be favorably compared to any weapons we turn out, the great bulk of them come either from China or from Russia. Most of those which come from Russia are actually made at the Skoda Works in Czechoslovakia.

Mr. SCOTT. Therefore, they have to come down from China, not from Russia. Earlier testimony indicates that the bulk of petroleum comes in through Haiphong, yet I am told to ignore that.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. It practically all comes in through Haiphong. Most of the weapons come in through Haiphong. That is the reason why I say that we should close the port at Haiphong. It is a natural step for us to take.

Mr. SCOTT. I completely agree with the Senator from Georgia that it should be closed in one of the several ways the Senator has mentioned, but we are asked to believe something which, to me, is a semantic impossibility. We are asked to believe that North Vietnam contributes nothing to South Vietnam, that anyway it does not matter if petroleum does come in, although it does come into Haiphong from Russia, that the economy of North Vietnam really contributes nothing to South Vietnam and therefore we should not worry about it. Admiral McDonald clarifies the situation further by saying that it does not matter about motorized transportation because everyone in Vietnam walks, anyway. He goes on to explain that last statement by saying that they walk from the 19th parallel but use motorized transportation from the north. If they use motorized transportation from the north, let me observe that I know very little about motors but I do know that they require fuel, lubricants, gasoline, yet we are told that while this comes entirely from Russia yet the

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contribution from North Vietnam really amounts to nothing to South Vietnam. Now, let me say to the Senator from Georgia, the more testimony I read, the more confused I get. Can the Senator help me find my way through this morass of semantics?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I had assumed that the statement referred to by the Secretary referred mainly to principal weapons which might be manufactured in North Vietnam. I do not believe that the Secretary would take a position the weapons did not come through, because North Vietnam is the only place they could come from. I believe that he is referring to sources of production more than he is referring to sources of supply.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Mr. President, will the Senator from Georgia yield?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. I yield.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. The Senator will recall in one of the hearings that captured North Vietnamese weapons were displayed as coming from China or Russia.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. The Senator is correct.

Mr. SALTONSTALL. Certainly, none of them was manufactured in North Vietnam.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. But they had to come in through North Vietnam.

Mr. SCOTT. Well, if the contribution of North Vietnam to South Vietnam is not worth anything, in the words of the Secretary—if the Secretary is right—"it could be completely eliminated, referring to the industry of the north, "and not reduce in any substantial way the contribution of the North to South Vietnam."

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Yes.

Mr. SCOTT. He is bypassing the fact that the North Vietnamese people are receiving oil and Chinese and Russian weapons; is that not a fact?

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. As I stated, I thought the Secretary was referring to sources of production and not sources of supply.

Of course, North Vietnam has a very limited industry. They do manufacture some weapons, but the principal weapons being utilized against us are made in China or sent from Russia. They are the two principal sources of supply. They are supplying them with vast quantities of sophisticated, deadly, and lethal weapons.

Mr. STENNIS. Mr. President, the appropriation for military construction requested in this supplemental bill amounts to \$1,238,400,000, distributed among the services as follows: Department of the Army, \$509,700,000; Department of the Navy, \$254,600,000; Department of the Air Force, \$274,100,000; and Department of Defense, emergency fund, \$200 million.

I would like to point out that this is only a further increment to military construction funds for southeast Asia. To date we have already appropriated for southeast Asia, approximately \$417,700,000, distributed as follows: Army, \$162,200,000; Navy, \$117,600,000; Air Force, \$137,900,000.

By the way of explanation, I would like to point out that funds spent, funds available, and the funds presently in this bill will make a total appropriation for military construction, southeast Asia, amounting to \$1,656,100,000.

In view of the urgency of this construction money for southeast Asia, the Military Construction Subcommittee of the Appropriations Committee, did not review the many projects in this bill in our usually thorough manner, meaning that we did not go into a detailed review of each individual project and the holding of extensive hearings. A great deal of the information concerning these projects is classified; however, the Department of Defense and the military services did furnish the subcommittee with classified information as to the location of projects and the intended scope of construction.

This bill contains language which will insure that the Congress will be fully informed as to how the Department of Defense and the military services expend these appropriations. I am sure everyone in this body knows my views concerning the constitutional responsibility of the Congress in matters of defense policy. There is in this supplemental bill, section 102, subsection E, language which reads as follows:

(b) Within 30 days after the end of each quarter, the Secretary of Defense shall render to the Committees on Armed Services and Appropriations of the House of Representatives and the Senate, a report with respect to the estimated value by purpose, by country, of support furnished from such appropriations.

I wish to point out to my colleagues of the Senate that part of this construction money will be expended on permanent facilities both in the United States and overseas; for example, money will be spent for construction on bases for Guam, Okinawa, Wake Island, and in the United States which I will discuss later in this presentation.

A major construction effort is required to provide the proper logistic base from which to project our military operations in South Vietnam. The major portion of the military construction funds in this bill amounting to \$736,600,000 is for construction in South Vietnam; approximately \$325 million is for facilities outside of South Vietnam to support our logistics and communication bases; and \$63,421,000 is for construction in the United States, which is solely to support our southeast Asia operations. As further examples, we plan to spend approximately \$36 million in the Republic of the Philippines mainly for supply and operational facilities including hospitals and utilities. Thirteen million, six hundred and ninety thousand dollars is earmarked for Guam for hospitals and medical facilities, operational facilities and troop housing.

I would like to close, Mr. President, by saying that the effectiveness of our highly trained forces with their modern equipment will be greatly enhanced when the items contained in this military construction program begin to be used.

GOVERN in the chair). Pursuant to the unanimous-consent agreement entered into yesterday, the Senate will now proceed to vote on H.R. 13546.

The question is on the engrossment of the amendments and third reading of the bill.

The amendments were ordered to be engrossed and the bill to be read a third time.

The bill was read the third time.

The PRESIDING OFFICER. The bill having been read the third time the question is, Shall it pass? On this question the yeas and nays have been ordered; and the clerk will call the roll.

The legislative clerk proceeded to call the roll.

Mr. LONG of Louisiana. I announce that the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE] and the Senator from New Mexico [Mr. MONTOYA], are absent on official business.

I also announce that the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], are necessarily absent.

I further announce that, if present and voting, the Senator from Indiana [Mr. BAYH], the Senator from Tennessee [Mr. GORE], the Senator from Alabama [Mr. HILL], the Senator from Michigan [Mr. McNAMARA], the Senator from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE], the Senator from South Carolina [Mr. RUSSELL], and the Senator from Alabama [Mr. SPARKMAN], would each vote "yea."

Mr. DIRKSEN. I announce that the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS] is absent on official business.

The Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL] is absent because of illness.

The Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] is necessarily absent.

If present and voting, the Senator from New York [Mr. JAVITS], the Senator from California [Mr. KUCHEL], and the Senator from Iowa [Mr. MILLER] would each vote "yea."

The result was announced—yeas 87, nays 2, as follows:

[No. 59 Leg.]

YEAS—87

Alken	Fulbright	Mundt
Allott	Harris	Murphy
Anderson	Hart	Muskie
Bartlett	Hartke	Nelson
Bass	Hayden	Neuberger
Bennett	Hickenlooper	Pearson
Bible	Holland	Pell
Boggs	Hruska	Proxmire
Brewster	Inouye	Randolph
Burdick	Jackson	Ribicoff
Byrd, Va.	Jordan, N.C.	Robertson
Byrd, W. Va.	Jordan, Idaho	Russell, Ga.
Cannon	Kennedy, Mass.	Saltonstall
Carlson	Kennedy, N.Y.	Scott
Case	Lausche	Simpson
Church	Long, Mo.	Smathers
Clark	Long, La.	Smith
Cooper	Magnuson	Stennis
Cotton	Mansfield	Symington
Curtis	McCarthy	Talmadge
Dirksen	McClellan	Thurmond
Dodd	McGee	Tower
Dominkick	McGovern	Tydings
Douglas	McIntyre	Williams, N.J.
Eastland	Metcalfe	Williams, Del.
Ellender	Mondale	Yarborough
Ervin	Monroney	Young, N. Dak.
Fortson	Morton	Young, Ohio
Gold	Moss	

March 22, 1966

## CONGRESSIONAL RECORD — SENATE

6161

NAYS—2  
 Gruening Morse  
 NOT VOTING—11  
 Bayh Kuchel Pastore  
 Gore McNamara Russell, S.C.  
 Hill Miller Sparkman  
 Javits Montoya

So the bill (H.R. 13546) was passed.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, the distinguished Senator from Georgia [Mr. RUSSELL] again has used his unmatched military expertise and his strong and articulate advocacy to obtain the Senate's overwhelming approval of the defense supplemental appropriation.

Again, that outstanding statesman has won for our fighting men, whose vital needs he knows so well, the decisive support they deserve so much. All America is grateful for his deep and abiding devotion. For all America recognizes that he, more than anyone, has assured the reality of his avowed objective: To see that our soldiers are better supplied than any other fighting men on earth. No man has worked harder to achieve that goal.

The success of this vital appropriation was due also to the efforts of the Senate's highly able patriarch, the distinguished chairman of the Appropriations Committee, the Senator from Arizona [Mr. HAYDEN] who backed this measure with the wise advocacy which has characterized his many decades of outstanding service in this body. To the distinguished senior Senators from Rhode Island [Mr. PASTORE] and from Missouri [Mr. SYMINGTON], a debt of gratitude is owed for their strong and articulate support.

Additionally, we are indebted as always to the distinguished senior Senator from Massachusetts [Mr. SALTONSTALL] for his cooperative support. The eloquent plea for swift and decisive Senate action by the ranking minority member of the Appropriations Committee helped immensely to assure this great success.

We appreciate too the help given by the distinguished senior Senator from Pennsylvania [Mr. CLARK] and by the junior Senators from South Dakota [Mr. McGOVERN] and Arkansas [Mr. FULBRIGHT], whose analytical discussions were typically provocative and enlightening. To the distinguished senior Senator from Oregon [Mr. MORSE] goes high commendation for again applying his cooperative efforts to assure the prompt and orderly action of the Senate on this important measure.

Finally, I personally am grateful to the Senate as a whole both for its swift and efficient action and for giving its unequivocal backing to those brave fighting men who deserve it so much.

#### DEATH OF MILTON KELLY, OF THE ASSOCIATED PRESS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I have just noticed on the AP ticker a news item to the effect that an old and good friend, Milton Kelly, Associated Press reporter since 1930, died today in George Washington Hospital after a long illness.

I have watched him in his illness over the past several years. I have noticed him come back time after time after time, always with a cheery smile. He always did a good job. He was always considerate of others.

It is with deep sadness that I note the passing of Milt Kelly. Mrs. Mansfield and I extend our deepest sympathy to his family. Milt was a good friend and a good man.

Mr. RUSSELL of Georgia. Mr. President, I hope the Senator will permit me to associate myself with all he has said with respect to Milton Kelly.

It has been my pleasure and privilege to deal with hundreds of members of the press during my public career, which has stretched over a number of years, but I have never known a man I trusted more completely in discussing matters that would help him with the story, but were not for publication, than I did Milton Kelly. He was indeed a gentleman to the manner born, a man of integrity and courage. We mourn his passing, and extend our sympathy to his family.

Mr. COOPER. Mr. President, I, too, wish to associate myself with the remarks just made. It was with sadness that I learned about the passing of Milt Kelly. I knew him as a fine, searching newspaperman, a fine reporter, a man of great integrity and character.

I am saddened to hear the news of his death. I am sure all of us extend to his family our feelings of deep sadness and affection.

Mr. THURMOND. Mr. President, I was saddened to learn of the passing of G. Milton Kelly. Milt Kelly, as he was affectionately known, was a highly respected and capable journalist whose pleasant and affable way won many friends for him in his tenure as an Associated Press reporter assigned to the U.S. Senate.

His coverage of some of the most controversial and heated investigations which took place in the Senate during his service here was noted for its objectivity and fairness to all sides. Milt will be sorely missed by the Members of the Senate, his many friends, and by his colleagues in the journalism profession.

#### AUTHORITY TO RECEIVE MESSAGES, FILE REPORTS, AND SIGN BILLS

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that during the adjournment of the Senate following today's session, the Secretary of the Senate be authorized to receive messages from the President of the United States and the House of Representatives; that committees be authorized to file reports; and that the Vice President or President pro tempore be authorized to sign duly enrolled bills.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### ORDER FOR ADJOURNMENT UNTIL FRIDAY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when the Senate completes its business today it adjourn until 12 o'clock noon on Friday next.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

#### TIRE SAFETY

Mr. MANSFIELD. Mr. President, I ask unanimous consent that when S. 2669, the tire safety bill, is reported from the Committee on Commerce it be made the pending business.

The VICE PRESIDENT. Without objection, it is so ordered.

Mr. MORSE. The bill just read is to be the pending business on Friday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. The Senator is correct.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator from Montana expect disposition of that bill on Friday?

Mr. MANSFIELD. I do not know.

Mr. MAGNUSON. The bill as being reported by the committee has been worked over, and practically all of the committee is unanimous in the reporting of the bill. Several sections were modified and amended. I do not expect too much opposition to the bill as reported. The bill merely affects uniform tire safety as against another bill on which we are holding hearings which deals with automobile safety.

Mr. MORSE. Does the Senator anticipate a rollcall vote on Friday?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I would like to have a rollcall vote on the bill when we are all through with it. That depends on how far we get with the bill on Friday.

Mr. MANSFIELD. Would the Senator insist on a rollcall vote?

Mr. MAGNUSON. I would not insist on a rollcall vote.

Mr. MORSE. I think if the Senator wants it we should have it. It may be necessary to rearrange our programs so that those of us who do not wish to miss rollcall votes may be present.

I do not understand why we quit on Tuesday and reconvene on Friday.

Mr. MAGNUSON. This bill has not been reported. We are working on the report. I believe it will be filed late today. It is doubtful. It may be tomorrow morning. I would be glad to accommodate any Senators if there is sufficient interest in a rollcall vote and the leadership says we will vote on it at a time certain on Monday.

Mr. MORSE. I am not speaking for myself, although I am included in what I say, but I am advised that several Members of the Senate plan to be away on Friday for various party affairs—I mean political party affairs—and perhaps we could have a vote on Monday and not have a vote on Friday, in view of the fact that there is this long postponement from Tuesday until Friday when we are ready to stay here during the week and do business. I am ready to stay Friday, but I wish to know if it is necessary to cancel my engagement on Friday to be here to cast my vote.

Mr. MANSFIELD. No; I would not say that. We will see what we can do. I am certain this can be worked out to the satisfaction of all Senators.

Mr. MAGNUSON. The Senator from Washington would be the last to suggest otherwise.